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THE NEW GERMAN SYSTEM OF RESCUING 
BANKS 
Christoph G. Paulus* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a well known fact that Germany was also hit by the 2008 financial 
market crisis. Banks, including the IKB Bank and the Hypo Real Estate 
Bank, tumbled and were on the verge of going bankrupt. Dramatic, 
overnight rescue operations1 became necessary. Although these operations 
were indispensable for the general public’s trust in the financial system, and 
thus, in the economy in general, they were also very expensive. Therefore, a 
number of “fig leaves”2 were put in place to mitigate tax payers’ displeasure 
with paying for the losses; yet, losing out on the gains was of only 
temporary political help. Nevertheless, following the lead of the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland, the German legislature decided to strengthen its 
insolvency prevention measures within the banking sector. This new 
legislation broke new ground, at least for Germany.3 The already existing 
control mechanisms were improved; and, more importantly, entirely new 
mechanisms were introduced. 
These innovations may be seen primarily in relation to the general 
insolvency law. Therefore, in order to fully understand the implications of 
the newly enacted Restrukturierungsgesetz (Restructuring Statute, 
henceforth ReSt),4 it may be useful to describe Germany’s insolvency 
practice5 as it existed before the enactment of the ReSt (i.e., before January 
1, 2011). Indeed, though on its surface the statute is directed towards failing 
banks, it is also meant to be a test-drive for a number of features which are 
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 1. Ulrich Seibert, Deutschland im Herbst–Erinnerungen an die Entstehung des 
Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetzes im Oktober 2008, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS HOPT 2525, 
2529 (Grundmann et al. eds., 2010) (Ger.). 
 2. See Manfred Obermüller & Karen Kuder, Die Entwicklung der Gesetzgebung zu 
Bankinsolvenzen, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE INSOLVENZRECHT [ZINSO] 2016, 2016 
(2010) (Ger.) (providing a short overview of all such legislative measures). See also Gregor 
Bachmann, Das neue Restrukturierungsrecht der Kreditinstitute, 22 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTSCHAFT [ZBB] 459, 460 (2010) (Ger.). 
 3. This step still needs to be fulfilled on the Eurogroup level. See Christoph G. Paulus, Ein 
Regelungssystem zur Schaffung eines internationalen Insolvenzrechts für Staaten, 25 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR GESETZGEBUNG [ZG] 313, 319 (2010) (Ger.); Christoph G. Paulus, A Resolvency Proceeding 
for Defaulting Sovereigns, 3 INT’L INSOLVENCY L. REV. [IILR] 1, 1 (2012). 
 4. Restrukturierungsgesetz [RStruktG] [Restructuring Statute], Dec. 9, 2010, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 1900 (Ger.) [hereinafter ReSt]. 
 5. See generally Christoph G. Paulus, The New German Insolvency Code, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
141 (1998); see also Christoph G. Paulus, Germany: Lessons to Learn from the Implementation of 
a New Insolvency Code, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 89 (2001) (providing a general description of 
Germany’s insolvency legislation). 
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intended to be—sooner or later—transferred to the general insolvency law 
that is applicable to all insolvent entities.6 
I. THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM 
Under the previous bank insolvency regime, a bank’s insolvency would 
be subjected to the general insolvency law of the Insolvenzordnung 
(Insolvency Ordinance, henceforth InsO).7 In theory, a bank would be 
treated like any other insolvent enterprise. This scenario, however, rarely 
applied because the right to file a petition was reserved exclusively for the 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Federal Agency for 
Financial Service Supervision, henceforth BaFin).8 Furthermore, in addition 
to this exclusive right, BaFin was entrusted with some instruments designed 
to prevent a financial institution from going bankrupt. As a result, the 
application of the general insolvency law was rarely used.  
In truth, the hope of applying the rescue option is (and always has been) 
in vain. Banks and other financial institutions are so dependent on their 
customers’ trust that any contact with an insolvency court would lead to a 
run on the bank that would immediately destroy the business;9 this is true at 
least in jurisdictions like Germany where the stigma of bankruptcy remains 
paramount.10 While these facts demonstrate that preventive measures are 
important,11 the last financial crisis showed that these instruments are not 
sufficient. The new legislation seeks to make the necessary improvements.12  
II. THE LACK OF A RESCUE CULTURE 
The general German insolvency law draws a clear line between a court-
driven insolvency proceeding and any out of court rescue. Whereas the 
former is regulated entirely by the InsO, the latter is not—which means that 
in practice all measures have to be taken from, for instance, general contract 
                                                                                                                                
 6. See discussion infra Part II. 
 7. Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [Insolvency Ordinance], Oct. 5, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, 
Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 2866, as amended Dec. 7, 2011, BGBL. I at 2582 (Ger.) [hereinafter InsO]. 
See EVA H.G. HÜPKES, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANK INSOLVENCY, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF WESTERN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 57, 117 (2000) (providing a concise 
description of the previous bank insolvency system); KLAUS PANNEN, KRISE UND INSOLVENZ BEI 
KREDITINSTITUTEN 113 (3rd ed. 2010). 
 8. See BUNDESANSTALT FÜR FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT, http://www.bafin.de/EN 
/Home/homepage__node.html?__nnn=true (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
 9. See Daniel Zimmer & Florian Fuchs, Die Bank in Krise und Insolvenz: Ansätze zur 
Minderung des systemischen Risikos, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 597, 599 (2010) (Ger.) (discussing the interconnectedness of the 
banking sector); see also Obermüller & Kuder, supra note 2, at 2017. 
 10. See Christoph G. Paulus, Ein Kaleidoskop aus der Geschichte des Insolvenzrechts, 64 
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 1148, 1149 (2009) (Ger.) (providing a history of the stigma of bankruptcy 
proceedings in Germany). 
 11. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 459. 
 12. See discussion infra Part II. 
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law, commercial law, and some other appropriate bodies of law. This strict 
distinction has come under criticism in recent years.13  
Such criticism was not necessarily due to influence from the United 
States, where the Chapter 11 proceeding represents a kind of archetype for 
the hybrid character of a prevention and insolvency type of proceeding. 
Rather, it was the development within the area of the European Insolvency 
Regulation, where the German jurisdiction was confronted again and again 
with the insolvency prevention measures of other states. In particular, when 
German companies started to move their center of main interests (COMI) to 
England in order to benefit from its Company Voluntary Arrangement, the 
discussion in Germany intensified. It further intensified in 2011 when 
German companies started to restructure their financial difficulties by 
making use of the English Scheme of Arrangement without changing their 
COMI.14 Other member states, such as Italy, Greece, and, above all, France, 
have also developed elaborate pre-insolvency procedures to prevent 
companies from being forced into a regular insolvency (or liquidation) 
proceeding. 
The discussion in Germany about the benefit or disadvantage of this 
type of proceeding is still going on even despite the fact that the 
forthcoming amendment to the InsO is called Gesetz zur weiteren 
Erleichterung von Sanierungen für Unternehmen (Statute for the 
Facilitation of Companies’ Reorganizations, henceforth ESUG).15  
III. SPECIFIC INSOLVECY-RELATED ISSUES 
Finally, there are a number of specific insolvency-related issues in the 
present InsO, and the way it has been interpreted is the subject of (partly 
long-lasting) complaints. Suffice it to mention here: 
 
 the lack of any authority to have the insolvent company’s 
shareholders included within the proceeding (the abbreviation 
here, the debt-equity swap); 
                                                                                                                                
 13. See Christoph G. Paulus, Deutschlands langer Weg in die insolvenzrechtliche Moderne – 
Auf der Suche nach einer Sanierungskultur (Rescue Culture), 65 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 
[WM] 2205, 2205 (2011) (Ger.). 
 14. See Christoph G. Paulus, Das englische Scheme of Arrangement – ein neues Angebot auf 
dem europäischen Markt für außergerichtliche Restrukturierungen, 32 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1077, 1077 (2011) (Ger.); Peter Mankowski, Anerkennung englischer 
Solvent Schemes of Arrangement in Deutschland, 65 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1201 
(2011) (Ger.); Horst Eidenmüller & Tilmann Frobenius, Die internationale Reichweite eines 
englischen Scheme of Arrangement, 65 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1210, 1219 (2011) 
(Ger.).  
 15. Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen [ESUG] [Statute for 
the Facilitation of Companies’ Reorganizations], Dec. 7, 2011, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 
[BGBL. I] at 2582 (Ger.) (providing exclusively intra-insolvency measures).  
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 the notorious German problem of having no ability to predict 
the insolvency administrator because the appointment is left to 
the exclusive, and jealously kept, power of the insolvency 
judge; and 
 the multiplicity of insolvency courts and the resulting lack of 
expertise among many insolvency judges. 
A. THE DESCRIPTION 
The ReSt is designed to overcome all these deficiencies.16 It consists of 
a package of different measures, of which the four most important shall be 
discussed in this paper. Even though these and several other measures were 
discussed widely in the European context, and even though the European 
Commission plans to come up sooner or later with its own rescue 
instrument,17 Germany felt the need to expedite the process by setting up its 
own legislation. It remains to be seen whether the ReSt will need 
adaptations or amendments once Europe has acted. 
1. Reorganization of Credit Institutions 
Part 1 of the ReSt contains the abovementioned test-drives; it is called 
Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten (Statute for the 
Reorganization of Credit Institutions, henceforth CIReSt).18 It consists of 
two parts, of which the first, Sanierungsverfahren (rescue proceeding),19 is 
applicable to all credit institutions, whereas the second, 
Reorganisationsverfahren (reorganization proceeding),20 is reserved for 
those few institutions whose failure and breakdown would create a systemic 
risk.  
a. Commonalities 
Section 1 of CIReSt is a general statute which applies to both types of 
proceedings. With respect to CIReSt’s applicability, it defines in paragraph 
1 which credit institutions are addressed. Accordingly, only those 
institutions, which fall under the definition in section 1 of 
                                                                                                                                
 16. Other issues, particularly taxation issues, remain unresolved. Hans-Jürgen A. Feyerabend, 
Stephan Behnes & Marcus Helios, Steuerliche Aspekte des Banken-Restrukturierungsgesetzes, 64 
DER BETRIEB [DB], supplement 4, 30, 30 (2011) (Ger.). 
 17. See Klaus J. Hopt, Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen europäischen und internationalen 
Finanzmarktarchitektur, 12 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] 1401, 1401 
(2009) (Ger.). See also Urs Zulauf, Schweizer Bankensanierungsrecht – geeignet für 
systemrelevante Banken?: Ein Vergleich mit den Vorschlägen in Deutschland, 64 WERTPAPIER-
MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 1525 (2010) (Ger.) (discussing the system in Switzerland). 
 18. Kreditinstitute-Reorganisationsgesetz [KredReorgG] [Statute for the Reorganization of 
Credit Institutions], Dec. 9, 2010, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 1900 (Ger.) 
[hereinafter CIReSt]. 
 19. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.b. 
 20. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.c. 
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Kreditwesengesetz (Banking Act, henceforth BAct) and which have their 
seat within Germany, are included. This excludes, for instance, financial 
service providers, investment trusts, and foreign credit institutions. Section 
1, paragraph 3 of CIReSt serves the purpose of accelerating both 
proceedings by ordering that all judicial decisions be given by judicial 
resolution (Beschluss) rather than a full-fledged decision; this means that, 
pursuant to the common terminology of the Zivilprozessordnung (Civil 
Procedure Ordinance, henceforth CPO),21 oral proceedings are dispensable. 
Moreover, the same paragraph decrees that all those resolutions are 
incontestable, which means that they are binding as soon as they are issued. 
Taken together with the fact that the Frankfurt Court of Appeal has 
exclusive jurisdiction, these rules are likely to become a model for 
commercial insolvency law in general. 
There is one more noteworthy commonality of the two types of 
proceedings that is meant to serve as an incentive to make use of them: If a 
credit institution petitions for either one of the proceedings, it is relieved 
from its duty to notify BaFin of its inability to pay or its over-
indebtedness.22 
b. Rescue Proceeding 
Sections 2 through 6 of CIReSt deal with the rescue proceeding. It is, 
like the reorganization procedure,23 an optional procedure which was 
originally intended to be available to all German credit institutions 
whenever they felt the need for a rescue attempt. This instrument should, 
thus, have been available at any time, even long before insolvency. In the 
last minute of the legislative process, however, this unrestricted time 
requirement was changed by inserting into section 2, paragraph 1 of CIReSt 
the request that certain requirements of section 45 of the BAct be fulfilled. 
This set of eligibility requirements reflects the typical German distrust in 
the responsible handling of legal instruments by private parties;24 obviously, 
it was feared that, without such restrictions, the rescue proceeding might be 
abused. This fear is even more irksome as CIReSt explicitly states: “The 
rescue plan might contain all sorts of measures suitable for the rescue of the 
credit institution as long as they do not touch the rights of third parties.”25 
                                                                                                                                
 21. Zivilprozessordnug [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Ordinance], Jan. 30, 1877, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBl.] at 83, as amended Dec. 22, 2011, BGBL. I at 3044 (Ger.) 
[hereinafter CPO]. 
 22. Under the Kreditwesengesetz (Banking Act), an institution that becomes insolvent or 
overindebted is required to immediately report this fact to the Federal Banking Supervisory 
Office. Kreditwesengesetz [KWG] [Banking Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 
[BGBL. I] at 2776, as amended Dec. 22, 2011, BGBL. I at 3044, § 46b (Ger.) [hereinafter BAct]. 
 23. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.c. 
 24. This distrust can also be described as a lack of a rescue culture in Germany. 
 25. CIReSt, supra note 18, § 2, para. 2, sentence 2 (Ger.) (translated by author). 
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Note that such third parties are, in particular, creditors! But let us go step by 
step. 
The rescue procedure begins with a petition by the credit institution to 
BaFin. It must (1) indicate the distressed situation, (2) be accompanied by 
an elaborated rescue plan, and (3) contain a proposal of a qualified rescue 
adviser. The rescue advisor can even be a member of the board of directors 
of the institution.26 It is explicitly provided that an advisor is not 
disqualified by his or her participation in the drafting of the rescue plan.27 If 
BaFin deems this application appropriate, it shall immediately file a petition 
with the (exclusively competent) Court of Appeal in Frankfurt to open the 
rescue proceeding. BaFin appends to this petition its own assessment of the 
rescue plan, in addition to its evaluation of the rescue adviser; both BaFin 
and the court have the right to propose a different advisor.28 
The rescue adviser’s position and competence is comparable to that of 
the preliminary insolvency administrator in the commercial insolvency area. 
The main task of the rescue advisor is to implement the rescue plan.29 For 
this purpose, the adviser is granted a number of powers—ranging from the 
right to enter into an investigation within the credit institution over its right 
to participate in meetings to the right to give instructions about the 
management. In addition to these generally existing powers of the adviser, 
the Court of Appeal can order further measures if required; these may range 
from inhibiting directors from further action, to obliging the directors to 
appoint the adviser to the board, to examining the appropriateness of the 
management’s salaries. 
This description of the rescue procedure makes it clear that its essential 
feature is the rescue plan. It may, for instance, provide for increasing equity 
or adding borrowed capital, reducing the labor force of the institution, or 
selling certain parts of that institution’s commercial enterprise. As 
aforementioned, this plan, however, must not contain any regulations which 
would interfere with third parties’ rights. Nevertheless, there is one explicit 
exemption to that, pursuant to section 2, paragraph 2 of CIReSt: the plan 
may include a clause which grants a super priority to rescue new creditors30 
over existing creditors, provided that, despite the rescue efforts, an 
insolvency proceeding takes place within the next three years, and that the 
                                                                                                                                
 26. Id. § 3, para. 3. 
 27. Id. § 3, para. 1. These rules are understandable after considering the predominant, general 
practice of German insolvency courts, which never appoint an administrator who has had any 
interference with the debtor before the filing of the petition. The ESUG is now about to introduce 
rules which will overcome this problem in the general commercial insolvency context. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. § 6.  
 30. It is not entirely clear whether this privilege is applicable also for credits given by 
shareholders of that credit institution. Pursuant to the general insolvency law, shareholder credits 
are subordinated. See, e.g., Bachmann, supra note 2, at 461; Obermüller & Kuder, supra note 2, at 
2019. 
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thus privileged credit frame does not exceed the sum of 10 percent of the 
equity capital. In light of these restrictions and, even more importantly, in 
light of the notorious German antipathy against the publicity of one’s own 
financial distress,31 it is highly dubious that this type of procedure will ever 
be used by any credit institution.32 
c. Reorganization Proceeding 
The reorganization proceeding is much more elaborate; it evokes, in 
many respects, the so-called plan proceeding of sections 217 through 269 of 
the InsO, which itself is a modified version of the U.S. Chapter 11 
proceeding. But the reorganization proceeding refines the plan proceeding, 
in areas where past experience has shown that changes are necessary, by 
accelerating the proceeding by (1) limiting the option to appeal, (2) 
including the shareholders, (3) broadening of the debtor-in-possession 
option, and (4) possibly limiting the proceeding to the main creditors. 
Like the rescue proceeding, the reorganization proceeding is just an 
option granted to German credit institutions. It is up to the institution 
whether to make use of it and whether to use it instead of a rescue 
proceeding or thereafter; the proceeding is, accordingly, a voluntary one.33 
This option, however, is very much restricted in its applicability. Pursuant 
to section 7, paragraph 2 of CIReSt, it is reserved exclusively34 for credit 
institutions which are, according to section 48b of the BAct, of systemic 
relevance.35 The following are required: (1) a threat in the present situation 
to the further existence of that credit institution36 which might (2) ultimately 
lead to a threat to the entire system.37 Because of the centrality of this 
“nerve system,” special remedies are necessary, and therefore, the debtor is 
allowed to interfere with third parties’ rights in this type of procedure. 
                                                                                                                                
 31. This particular feature is best visible in the German law of secured transactions. 
 32. See Gunnar Schuster & Lars Westpfahl, Neue Wege zur Bankensanierung – Ein Beitrag 
zum Restrukrurierungsgesetz (Teil I), 64 DER BETRIEB [DB] 221, 223 (2011) (Ger.). Obermüller 
& Kuder, supra note 2, at 2018 (offering a more optimistic position). 
 33. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.b. 
 34. This restriction can rightly be criticized, see Bachmann, supra note 2, at 463. 
 35. In Germany, it is somewhat inappropriate to limit the discussion of systemic relevance 
(and its twin, “too big to fail”) to credit institutions. Systemic relevance is not confined to the 
banking sector. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 193 (2008). See also 
Peter Kindler, Finanzkrise und Finanzmarktregulierung – Ein Zwischenruf zum 68. Deutschen 
Juristentag, 63 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2465, 2467 (2010) (Ger.). See 
Zimmer & Fuchs, supra note 9, at 600. 
 36. This requirement is not exactly identical with the commercial insolvency law’s “imminent 
insolvency” of section 18 of the InsO. It is rather a non-compliance with certain fundamental 
conditions of the BAct; see Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 225. 
 37. See Klaus Pannen, Das geplante Restrukurierungsgesetz für Kreditinstitute, 13 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE INSOLVENZRECHT [ZINSO] 2026, 2029 (2010) (Ger.). 
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The reorganization proceeding, too, begins with a petition by the 
respective credit institution38 to BaFin, which again must be accompanied 
by a reorganization plan. As with the rescue proceeding, here, too, an 
adviser shall be nominated, and is called the reorganization adviser. The 
reorganization adviser can be member of the board of directors of the 
institution, or the drafter of the plan. Pursuant to section 13 of CIReSt, the 
effect of this petition is that any contractual agreements with the credit 
institution cannot be terminated until the end of the subsequent business 
day. It is to be assumed, however, that irrespective of section 13’s provision 
that agreements to the contrary shall be deemed to be void, this protection 
can quite easily be undermined by adjusting, accordingly, the respective 
contractual clauses to earlier automatic termination events.39 
After receiving the petition, BaFin examines whether the requirements 
of section 48b of the BAct are fulfilled and whether the reorganization 
proceeding appears to be appropriate. Thereby, BaFin is granted broad 
discretion, but it is to be assumed that BaFin will decide only after 
consultation with the Bundesbank (German Federal Bank). If the decision is 
in the affirmative, BaFin files the petition with the abovementioned Court 
of Appeal, which itself reexamines the requirements of systemic relevance 
and the legitimacy of the reorganization plan. 
What the legitimacy of the reorganization plan means is regulated in 
sections 8 through 13 of CIReSt. Accordingly, the plan consists of two 
parts: a descriptive part and a constructive part, which is similar to section 
220 of the InsO. The descriptive part provides information to all 
stakeholders on the status quo and the effects of the reorganization plan. In 
contrast, the constructive part is where one finds the interference with the 
creditors’ rights. For instance, “haircuts,” a moratorium, securitization, or 
any other restructuring of existing debts (e.g., by providing for a credit 
frame for privileging new creditors) will be inserted into this part of the 
plan.40 The same is true for a debt-equity swap, the details of which are 
included in section 9 of CIReSt. Note that there is a duty to adequately 
compensate the previous shareholders41 and that a debt-equity swap is 
dependent on the consent of every affected creditor. 
Finally, pursuant to section 11 of CIReSt, the constructive part of the 
reorganization plan might also provide for a spin-off of the credit 
institution’s means, in whole or in part, in an already existing or newly 
created entity. This option, however, must be designed in a way that does 
                                                                                                                                
 38. If a previous rescue proceeding was unsuccessful, this application has to be made by the 
rescue adviser. 
 39. See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 225. 
 40. CIReSt, supra note 18, § 12 (Ger.). 
 41. The adequacy of the compensation can be examined by at least one independent auditor 
who is selected and appointed by the court. It is debatable whether the adequacy is to be 
determined on the basis of a going concern or of a liquidation. See Obermüller & Kuder, supra 
note 2, at 2019; Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 227. 
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not interfere with existing netting systems.42 Furthermore, section 23 of 
CIReSt determines that such a spin-off must not affect any collateral or 
payment and settlement system. 
Creditors of the respective credit institution whose rights are affected 
by any of the interferences in the plan’s constructive part are requested to 
lodge their claims with the reorganization adviser. In a special examination 
meeting, these claims are examined and discussed if the adviser disputes 
their legitimacy. The result of the claims’ examination also determines the 
creditors’ voting rights. 
With respect to the reorganization’s acceptance, the procedure is again 
familiar as it strongly resembles the commercial insolvency law’s plan 
proceeding. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal holds a meeting at which the 
plan and the voting rights are to be discussed and at which a vote will be 
cast.43 The voting takes place in classes.44 As a result, only creditors 
similarly situated can be put together in one class. Insofar as shareholders’ 
rights are affected by the reorganization plan, they are to vote in a prior, 
separate shareholders’ meeting.45 This is deemed to be necessary because of 
the European Second Company Law Directive46 and the respective 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.47 The details of both voting 
mechanisms and their potential cram down are regulated in sections 17 
through 19 of CIReSt.48 
If the end result is acceptance of the plan, the Court of Appeal will 
double-check the correctness of the procedure and will then ultimately 
confirm the plan.49 From there, the provisions of the constructive part of 
that plan will enter into effect. 
2. Strengthening the Supervision 
Whereas the rescue and the reorganization proceeding, as described in 
the previous section, are left to the respective credit institutions or their 
directors, the second part of the ReSt demonstrates a certain distrust of this 
                                                                                                                                
 42. See Zimmer & Fuchs, supra note 9, at 617 (discussing the insolvency protection function). 
 43. CIReSt, supra note 18, § 16 (Ger.). 
 44. Id. § 8.  
 45. Id. § 18.  
 46. Council Directive 77/91, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EEC). See Horst Eidenmüller & Andreas 
Engert, Reformperspektiven einer Umwandlung von Fremd- in Eigenkapital (Debt-Equity Swap) 
im Insolvenzplanverfahren, 30 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 541, 547 (2009) 
(Ger.). 
 47. See cases C-19/90 & C-20/90, Karella v. Minister for Indus., Energy & Tech., 1991 E.C.R. 
I-2691 (Sixth Chamber); case C-381/89, Sindesmos Melon tis Eleftheras Evangelikis Ekklisias v. 
Greek State, 1992 E.C.R. I-2111 (Second Council Directive); case C-441/93, Pafitis v. Trapeza 
Kentrikis Ellados AE, 1996 E.C.R. I-1347 (Second Council Directive); case C-373/97, Diamantis 
v. Dimosio (Greek State), 2000 E.C.R. I-1705 (Sixth Chamber). 
 48. CIReSt, supra note 18, § 17, para. 2, sentence 2 (Ger.) (providing for creditors); id. § 18 
(providing for shareholders); id. § 19 (stating that all groups have to agree). 
 49. Id. § 20.  
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kind of party autonomy. As a consequence of the deficiencies recognized 
during the financial crisis of 2008, this part increases BaFin’s existing 
arsenal of protective measures to a considerable degree.50 Accordingly, 
most51 of the measures relating to those voluntary tools can be imposed by 
BaFin if it is of the opinion that those steps should be taken. For this 
purpose, it can even appoint a Sonderbeauftragten (special adviser) and 
entrust the advisor with all the authority thought to be appropriate in that 
particular case. This implies that the abovementioned voluntariness is 
reinforced by what might be called “gentle force” because the voluntary 
steps can be imposed anyway by BaFin. 
But there are even further reaching instruments that BaFin is now 
permitted to use. Most noteworthy is the Übertragungsanordnung (transfer 
order)—the power to transfer a credit institution’s capital, in full or in part, 
to a private bank or a public bridge bank. Such a step will facilitate the 
stabilization of that institution under the umbrella of the new bank whereas 
the “bad part” is separated. It is said that similar innovations are planned to 
be adopted through European legislation; however, the German legislature 
felt the need for prompt action and did not wait for Europe. The idea behind 
this approach is to rescue the “good bank” in the hands of the transferee 
whereas the “bad bank” is left behind with the transferor and doomed to be 
liquidated.52 Note that a transfer is admissible just with respect to the 
“good” assets;53 it is, thus, impossible to transfer toxic assets or the like to a 
“bad bank.” 
The transfer order is only permitted for credit institutions that have their 
seat in Germany and that are of systemic importance.54 Beyond this parallel 
with the aforementioned reorganization proceeding, the scope of the order’s 
applicability stretches to holding companies and other higher-ranked group 
institutions. Therefore, this tool appears to be more efficient than the 
voluntary one,55 but is somewhat hedged by the imposition that a transfer 
order can be imposed only as ultima ratio (i.e., there must be no other 
equally efficient remedy be available). This is an expression of the 
proportionality principle.56 
                                                                                                                                
 50. See Dirk Auerbach & Kirsten Donner, Änderungen bei den aufsichtlichen 
Eingriffsinstrumenten des KWG durch das Restrukturierungsgesetz, 64 DER BETRIEB [DB], 
supplement 4, 17, 17 (2011) (Ger.).  
 51. Unfortunately, BaFin has no power to prescribe a credit institution to come up with a 
reorganization plan. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 463. 
 52. See Obermüller & Kuder, supra note 2, at 2021. 
 53. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 467. 
 54. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 55. If necessary, BaFin might interrupt a reorganization proceeding and issue a transfer order 
as it may, the other way round, make the issuance of the transfer order dependant on the credit 
institution’s presentation of a reorganization plan which is apt to overcome the threat of 
insolvency within six weeks. 
 56. See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 282.  
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Pursuant to section 48c, paragraph 5 of the BAct, the transferee must be 
a legal person which has its headquarters within Germany. The transfer is 
admissible only when the transferee declares its consent in a notarially 
certified document. It is to be assumed that transfer orders will be issued 
only in extremely urgent cases; therefore, there might not be enough time to 
wait for such consent of the transferee. After all, it is an important business 
measure and, accordingly, the transferee must conduct much due diligence 
in order to take over an entire credit institution, or just parts of it. Thus, it is 
likely that the most attractive transferee will be a newly created bridge 
bank.57 Its “emptiness” alleviates the problems potentially arising out of the 
evaluation of the transfer’s consideration. Hence, the creation of stock 
bridge banks will be an important task.58 
Since it is the goal of any transfer order to save those parts of the credit 
institution which are of systemic relevance, the selection of the assets to be 
transferred is of significant importance. Section 48k, paragraph 2 of the 
BAct, however, clarifies that here, too, netting systems must not be split 
and that collateral must not be separated from the secured claim. Once the 
transfer is perfected, it is insolvency-proof, and the transferee is immune 
against any avoidance attempts.59 Its liability is, pursuant to section 48h, 
paragraph 1 of the BAct, subsidiary to that of the transferor and is restricted 
to the amount of the transferred liabilities which creditors presumably 
would have received if the transfer had not taken place. This limitation of 
risk is to be contrasted with the rule in section 48k, paragraph 3 of the 
BAct, which provides for non-subsidiary liability (i.e., joint liability of 
transferee and transferor for the liabilities remaining with the latter). This 
liability is limited, however, to the amount that the creditors would have 
received without any transfer. 
Judicial remedies against such a transfer order are restricted insofar as 
there is exclusive authority of the Court of Appeal in Kassel (section 48r of 
the BAct), which is an administrative law court. This results because a 
transfer order is an act which is subject to administrative law. Nevertheless, 
when all of these rescue measures ultimately fail and, in the end, a 
liquidation of a credit institution is inevitable, legislative measures provide 
for a closer cooperation between the banking supervision on the one hand 
and the insolvency court and administrator on the other.60  
                                                                                                                                
 57. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 469. 
 58. See discussion supra Part III. 
 59. BAct, supra note 22, § 48h, para. 2 (Ger.).  
 60. Id. § 46b, para. 3.  
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3. Restructuring Fund 
A further part of the ReSt is the Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz (Statute 
for the Restructuring Fund, henceforth ReStF)61 which provides for the 
establishment of a special fund, called Restrukturierungsfonds 
(Restructuring Fund). It has a limited legal capacity and constitutes a 
separate division of an already existing institution—the so-called 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung (Federal Agency for Financial 
Market Stabilization, henceforth FMSA).62 Its purpose is to collect financial 
resources that are to be used in the future for any restructuring or winding-
up measures of credit institutions that are of systemic relevance.63 In order 
to relieve the general taxpayer from bailouts, this fund is to be supported by 
financial contributions from all credit institutions in Germany;64 the target 
size of the fund is, pursuant to section 12, paragraph 10 of the ReStF, €70 
billion. 
The contribution rate, however, is not the same for all those institutions. 
Rather, the rate is to be calculated on the basis of the institution’s particular 
systemic risk. The determination of the individual institution’s risk is 
influenced by various factors: the size of the institution, its 
interconnectedness on the financial market, its liabilities, and possibly 
further elements. This rating serves the additional purpose of functioning as 
a kind of warning signal for the credit institution as it indicates its potential 
risk. 
The FMSA was established in 2008 in the context of the global 
financial crisis, and its authority has been broadened by the ReStF. The 
Restructuring Fund is in charge of avoiding the abovementioned threats for 
the respective credit institutions and for the financial market system as a 
whole.65 For this, it has its own right to examine whether a particular credit 
institution fulfills the requirements of systemic relevance; however, it is to 
be assumed that this evaluation will be done in close cooperation with 
BaFin, which, as previously mentioned, has the same right. If the 
Restructuring Fund comes to a positive conclusion, the respective credit 
institution has no claim on its own for support (i.e., it is left to the Fund’s 
discretion as to whether to help). Moreover, in principle, support can be 
                                                                                                                                
 61. Restrukturierungsfondsgesetz [RStruktFG] [Statute for the Restructuring Fund], Dec. 9, 
2010, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 1921 (Ger.) [hereinafter ReStF]. 
 62. BUNDESANSTALT FÜR FINANZMARKTSTABILISIERUNG, http://www.fmsa.de/en/ (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
 63. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.c. 
 64. See Hans-Jürgen A. Feyerabend, Stephan Behnes & Marcus Helios, Finanzierung des 
Restrukturierungsfonds durch die Bankenabgabe, 64 DER BETRIEB [DB], supplement 4, 38, 38 
(2011). See also DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 17/3024 (Ger.). 
 65. Pannen, supra note 37, at 2029 (recognizing a problem in that all credit institutions are 
bound to contribute payments to the Restructuring Fund but only the systemically relevant are 
potential recipients of support). Every financial institution, however, has at least the potential of 
systemic relevance. Id.  
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provided just for such credit institutions which are transferees of the 
abovementioned transfer order of BaFin. This excludes, e contrario, any 
support of a failing institution or the transferor.66 
Pursuant to section 3, paragraph 2 of the ReStF, the Restructuring Fund 
is granted a pool of four measures, under the ReStF, by which it may fulfill 
its tasks: the foundation of bridge institutions and acquisition of shares, 
section 5; guarantees, section 6; recapitalization, section 7; and other 
measures, section 8. Accordingly, bridge institutions can be founded 
without any existing particular need in order to keep them in stock. If there 
is an important interest of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Restructuring Fund is permitted to acquire shares of the transferee. This 
form of state involvement has its roots in the case of the Hypo Real Estate 
Holding AG which, in 2009, finally became nationalized and is now held 
by the Fund. Another way of supporting a transferee is the Fund’s ability to 
issue guarantees for the transferee’s debentures for a period of up to sixty 
months.67 The ceiling on such guarantees is €100 billion.68 
Pursuant to section 7 of the ReStF, an important interest of the Federal 
Republic of Germany is again necessary in order to support the transferee 
by helping with recapitalization (i.e., improving the credit institution’s 
equity). This help, however, comes with a “bitter pill”69: the annual salary 
of any board member and employee is limited to €500,000.70 Whether this 
really sets the right incentives for any credit institution to step in as 
transferee of a failing bank in a case of highest urgency is highly doubtful.71 
The “other measures” mentioned in section 8 of the ReStF are not meant to 
be a free ticket for any other imaginable kind of support; rather, they are 
ancillary measures that complement those aforementioned. 
4. Statute of Limitations 
The final tool is a seemingly tiny change to the existing law, which 
nonetheless, is based on insightful psychological considerations. For 
Aktiengesellschaften (joint stock companies) which are either credit 
institutions or are listed, the existing five-year statute of limitations for 
claims resulting from the management’s liability is prolonged to ten years. 
The reasons given for this amendment are (1) that more time is available for 
investigating respective claims, and (2) that the personal composition of the 
respective body might have changed within such time. The latter takes into 
account a possible, if not likely, reason for many companies’ past 
                                                                                                                                
 66. Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 287 (providing a justified criticism against this 
provision). 
 67. ReStF, supra note 61, § 6, para. 2 (Ger.).  
 68. Id.  
 69. The same is also true for the abovementioned acquisition of shares. See id. § 4, para. 3.  
 70. Id.  
 71. See Schuster & Westpfahl, supra note 32, at 288.  
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forbearances to claim damages from their managers—managers and 
supervisors might have been too closely interconnected. In such cases, the 
following motto might prevail: One crow does not peck the other’s eyes 
out. Since the regular office period of the supervisors (Aufsichtsrat) is about 
five years, the chances to claim damages increase when the statute of 
limitations is extended to ten years. 
B. THE EVALUATION 
This new package of legislation should be welcomed in many respects. 
It renders significant help to enhance rescue culture in Germany, it deviates 
from trodden paths, and it tries to discipline financial institutions. A number 
of features are innovative and have the potential to develop into important 
instruments of future financial markets. And it was—and still is—a highly 
visible sign that the legislature is ready to do something about banking 
failures. Insofar as commentators discover (or believe they have discovered) 
certain deficiencies in the various regulations, it is in most cases justified to 
be confident that the German judicature will find ways to get things right—
it has done so before in innumerable cases. 
Yet, a few features are more fundamental than merely technical; they 
concern the concept of the new legislation as a whole. Criticism here 
appears to be serious. This is true for the ReStF’s approach to abstain 
completely from assisting a failing credit institution.72 The idea that support 
should be given exclusively to the transferee and never to a transferor might 
seem theoretically sound; but in practice, it is to be feared that the 
rigorousness of this concept will work to accelerate crises. This follows 
from the fact that BaFin has no ability to impose a reorganization 
proceeding on a tumbling financial institution, and that the Restructuring 
Fund has to hold back its support until a transfer order has been made and a 
new institution is taking over. Not only may much precious time be lost by 
this point, but also the transfer in itself will be viewed by the general public 
as an eminent warning signal that the affairs of the transferor have certainly 
gone awry. By this point, it will be clear to everyone on the market that 
there is a big problem. Accordingly, at least some more flexibility for the 
Fund would have been preferable. 
Another even more fundamental deficiency of the new law is that which 
it has in common with countless other examples of reactionary legislation—
namely, it attempts to solve the problem without addressing its root. In 
other words, this law, again, cares about the symptoms rather than about the 
cause. Admittedly, this is easier said than transformed into a legislative 
reality. Yet, if there is such a strong emphasis on the systemic relevance in 
this statutory package, one would expect at least some concern about the 
notorious issue of “too big to fail.” This phenomenon—and in particular, 
                                                                                                                                
 72. See Bachmann, supra note 2, at 470. 
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the corresponding moral hazard problem which seduces managers to ignore 
economic risks—is likely one of the most important roots of the last crisis, 
and of many earlier ones as well. The ReSt, however, does not address this 
issue irrespective of the fact that the law’s exclusive concentration on the 
financial institutions’ sector would have made it somewhat easier to come 
to grips with this problem. Some might see the abovementioned transfer 
order by BaFin as a tool to minimize size and thus, to prevent the creation 
of institutions that are “too big to fail”; but the operation of this instrument 
comes too late for preventing a credit institution from becoming too big. 
Zimmer and Fuchs,73 in contrast, describe three areas (living wills, closeout 
netting, and clearing through central counterparties) in which regulators 
could exercise control for the benefit of mitigating the systemic risk. And 
Schuster,74 for instance, discusses the (primarily constitutional) legitimacy 
of regulatory measures in order to avoid the growth of a financial institution 
into systemic relevance. 
These are just a few examples of a much broader discussion in 
Germany about the ReSt and its effects, but they should suffice to 
demonstrate that the problems are broader than the law leads one to believe. 
It is regrettable that the legislature failed to seize this opportunity for reform 
when, at the same time, the new law already brings with it many 
innovations. 
CONCLUSION 
The new Restructuring Statute is the German reaction to the shock 
waves of the Lehman bankruptcy and the ensuing financial crisis. It tries to 
cope with numerous problems which became visible at some German 
banks, too, in the aftermath of that event. Likely due to the uniqueness of 
that event, the German legislature decided, at least in part, to enter new 
ground; in particular, it offered a combination of tools for the relevant 
institutions to use on a voluntary basis and tools for the regulators. Yet, the 
main issue in this context—the “too big to fail” phenomenon—is not 
addressed at all. This is a serious omission as it is very much at the heart of 
the problem. It is ominous that further crises and much more public 
discussion will be necessary before this central phenomenon will receive 
the urgently needed legislative attention that it requires. 
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